A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in L<sub>p</sub>-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent's valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Ewerhart, Christian
Other Persons:	Kovenock, Daniel J. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model

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