A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Vannucci, Stefano |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 12.2008, 1, p. 33-44
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Coalitional game forms | Core stability | Government forms |
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