A comment on efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game

This paper relaxes the Motta & Vasconcelos’ (2005) short-term assumption that firms’ capital is fixed. We demonstrate that, contrary to the conclusion of that article, in the best interest of consumers, even when firms have large economies of scale, long-term forward-looking Antitrust Authorities must block firms’ merger plans whenever profits of firms are positive.

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Year of publication:	2008-09
Authors:	Vieira, Pedro Cosme da Costa
Institutions:	Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto
Subject:	Antitrust policy \| Economies of scale

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Series:	FEP Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	5 pages
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L25 - Firm Size and Performance ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059466