A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies.

In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential , the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Albano, G.-L. ; Germano, F. ; Lovo, S.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| AUCTIONS

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	6 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669266