A CREDIBLE FOUNDATION FOR LONG TERM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
To succeed in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, a climate policy must establish credible long-term incentives for investments in the new energy-sector capital and in research and development. We argue that credibility implies that international agreements should focus on enhancing coordination and collaboration between countries, rather than on coercion. At the national level, credibility requires political and economic incentives that can be provided by long-term tradable emission permits, but it needs more flexibility than can be provided by a conventional permit system. We argue that the best mechanism for providing credible long-term incentives is a hybrid system of long and short term emissions permits. Key aspects of the system would be coordianted across countries but the permits would be issued and traded solely within national borders.
Year of publication: |
2006-04
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Authors: | McKibbin, Warwick J. ; Wilcoxen, Peter J. |
Institutions: | College of Business and Economics, Australian National University |
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