A discrete-time hazard model of the adoption of legislative television: evidence from the US Congress, 1961-1986
The present study examines the probability of the adoption of legislative television over time (1961-1986) in the US Congress using a discrete-time hazard model. Against a theoretical construct where political services are modelled as search/experience goods, evidence is provided suggesting that constituent homogeneity, relative power struggles involving the legislative branches of Congress and the White House, and the potential prowess of legislators in Congress regarding skilful use of television are all important facets in this probability model. Use of alternative data sources and statistical techniques, such as those presented here, works to provide a greater foundation of knowledge regarding the relationship between representative democracy and modern means of communication.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Mixon, Franklin |
Published in: |
Applied Economics. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 0003-6846. - Vol. 33.2001, 14, p. 1881-1887
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
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