A dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion
Marcel Boyer; Pierre Lasserre; Michel Moreaux
| Year of publication: |
2012
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Boyer, Marcel ; Lasserre, Pierre ; Moreaux, Michel |
| Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 30.2012, 6, p. 663-681
|
| Subject: | Real options | Dynamic duopoly | Lumpy investments | Preemption | Investment waves | Tacit collusion | Realoptionsansatz | Real options analysis | Duopol | Duopoly | Investition | Investment | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009699649