A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite
| Year of publication: |
January 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | MacLean, Richard P. ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 101.2017, p. 34-48
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| Subject: | Privacy | Auctions | Incentive compatibility | Mechanism design | Interdependent values | Ex post incentive compatibility | Informational size | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Anreiz | Incentives | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788429