A game-theoretic framework for estimating a health purchaser's willingness-to-pay for health and for expansion
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Yaesoubi, Reza ; Roberts, Stephen D. |
Published in: |
Health care management science. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 1386-9620, ZDB-ID 1469148-6. - Vol. 13.2010, 4, p. 358-377
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Subject: | Gesundheitsversorgung | Health care | Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse | Willingness to pay | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Krebskrankheit | Cancer | Allokation | Allocation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | USA | United States |
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