A Large Poisson Currency Crises Game: Towards a Theory of Both the Onset and the Swiftness of Currency Attacks.

Existing models of self-fulfilling crises fail to explain both the onset and the abruptness of recent currency attacks. In this apper we follow the suggestion by Myerson (1998) that in games with a very large number of players 'a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game.' In particular, we build a Large Poisson Currency Crises Game which turns out to be consistent with sudden attacks and unique equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Makris, M.
Institutions:	Business School, University of Exeter
Subject:	GAMES \| MODELS \| EXCHANGE RATE

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	18 pages
Classification:	F31 - Foreign Exchange ; D89 - Information and Uncertainty. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852275