A long-term contract with a possibility of dismissal for a multitasking agent

Meg Adachi-Sato

Year of publication:	May 6, 2022
Authors:	Adachi-Sato, Meg
Publisher:	Kobe, Japan : Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University
Subject:	fixed pay \| incentive pay \| dismissal wage contracts \| Kündigung \| Dismissal \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Lohn \| Wages \| Kündigungsschutz \| Dismissal protection \| Arbeitsproduktivität \| Labour productivity \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013503419

A service of the