A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value.

A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Voorneveld, M. ; Grahn, S.
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| ECONOMIC MODELS

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Series:	Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634533