A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value

A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Voorneveld, Mark ; Grahn, Sofia
Publisher:	Uppsala : Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Theorie \| Shapley-Wert \| Convex game \| unanimity game \| Shapley value \| axiomatization

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2001:2
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	877724113 [GVK] hdl:10419/82861 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2001_002 [RePEc]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321738