A model of delegated project choice
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Armstrong, Mark ; Vickers, John |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 78.2010, 1, p. 213-244
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Betriebliche Investitionstheorie | Corporate investment theory | Fusion | Merger | Fusionskontrolle | Merger control | Theorie | Theory |
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