A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Adachi, Tsuyoshi |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 87.2014, p. 508-518
|
Subject: | Implementation theory | Backward induction | Subgame perfect equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Ranking-Verfahren | Ranking method |
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