A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants

We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one di¤erent agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule (the winner is the deserving winner) in subgame perfect equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2010-07
Authors:	Amorós, Pablo
Institutions:	Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	mechanism design \| contests \| subgame perfect equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	Hungarian
Notes:	Number 2010-07 9 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008486381