A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games

We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009-12
Authors:	Tsomocos, Dimitrios ; Voliotis, Dimitris

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Notes:	Tsomocos, Dimitrios and Voliotis, Dimitris (2009) A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games. International Game Theory Review, 11 (4). pp. 479-489.
Other identifiers:	10.1142/S0219198909002467 [DOI]
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011423748