A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Guillén, Pablo ; Merrett, Danielle ; Slonim, Robert |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 61.2015, 7, p. 1514-1530
|
Subject: | team production | moral hazard | free riding | public goods | intergroup competition | voluntary contributions mechanism | economic experiments | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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