A Non-empty Core May Not Coincide with the Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Situations

In this note it is shown that in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (AJPS, 1987) (repeated in a number of subsequent works), the uncovered set in a spatial voting situation does not necessarily coincide with the core even when the core is non-empty.

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Year of publication:	2010-01
Authors:	Bhattacharya, A ; Brosi, V ; Ciardiello, F
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York
Subject:	spatial voting models \| uncovered set \| core \| stable set

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501698