A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions

Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Jehiel, Philippe ; Moldovanu, Benny
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2001, 2, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	efficiency

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094736