A note on LuenbergerÅ› zero-maximum principle for core allocations
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Courtault, Jean-Michel ; Crettez, Bertrand ; Hayek, Naila |
Published in: |
International game theory review. - [River Edge], NJ [u.a.] : World Scientific, ISSN 0219-1989, ZDB-ID 1500913-0. - Vol. 9.2007, 3, p. 453-460
|
Subject: | Core | Allokation | Allocation | Koalition | Coalition | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
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