A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms

This paper studies revenue-maximizing allocation mechanisms for multiple goods where the buyer's utility can depend non-linearly in his type. We point out that despite strictly increasing virtual utilities, the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization may fail to be increasing and thus it may violate incentive compatibility. More importantly, the revenue maximizing allocation may involve randomizations between dicurren;erent allocations

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Year of publication:	[2008]
Authors:	Skreta, Vasiliki
Other Persons:	Figueroa, Nicolás (contributor)
Publisher:	[2008]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency

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