A Note on the Core of Auctions with Externalities : No Seller's Deviation

In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We show that the core is nonempty if the seller cannot deviate, as a counterpart of the result of the nonemptiness of the core when bidders cannot refuse to pay

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Core \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Auktion \| Auction

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