A note on the efficiency gains from a refusal to deal in a Bertrand-Nash framework
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Nadimi, Soheil R. ; Weisman, Dennis L. |
Subject: | vertical integration | duty to deal | efficiency | antitrust | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Theorie | Theory | Effizienz | Efficiency | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy |
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