A note on the impact of procedures in strike models : the case of bargaining structure

Laszlo Goerke

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Goerke, Laszlo
Publisher:	Konstanz : Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss. und Statistik
Subject:	Private Information \| Joint Bargaining \| Strike Activity \| Arbeitskampf \| Industrial action \| Tarifverhandlungen \| Collective bargaining \| Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes \| Collective bargaining theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information