A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets

We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and no-positive-transfers. This holds even for two bidders, two items, and commonly-known budgets, and generalizes to richer settings.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Lavi, Ron ; May, Marina
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 1, p. 100-103
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Budget constraints \| Strategy-proofness \| Pareto-optimality

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572199