A Note on the Nash Equilibrium in Winner-take-all Bertrand Game

In this paper, we fully characterize the Nash Equilibrium in the winner-take-all Bertrand Game, showing that a mixed strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only if it is a zero operating profit one, and there exist at least two players whose bids are all unprofitable. Compared with previous work, our model setup is generalized to the scenarios where players are allowed to have heterogenous profit functions with the same lower bound of profitable prices

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Li, Xinmi ; Zheng, Jie
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory

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