A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kamiyama, Naoyuki |
Published in: |
Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 720735-9. - Vol. 41.2013, 5, p. 559-561
|
Subject: | Matching market | Serial dictatorship | Pareto efficiency | Strategy-proofness | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Theorie | Theory | Pareto-Optimum | Matching | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Allokation | Allocation |
-
Centralized allocation in multiple markets
Monte, Daniel, (2015)
-
Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
Cato, Susumu, (2013)
-
Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment : three impossibility results
Nesterov, Alexander, (2014)
- More ...
-
A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
Kamiyama, Naoyuki, (2013)
-
Matroid Intersection with Priority Constraints
Kamiyama, Naoyuki, (2013)
-
Yasui, Yuichiro, (2011)
- More ...