A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game

A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Evans, Robert
Published in:	Contributions to Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 3.2003, 1, p. 1066-1066
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	Rubinstein bargaining \| simultaneous offers \| Nash bargaining solution

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejte-1066
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005751272