A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Newton, Jonathan ; Sawa, Ryoji
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 157.2015, C, p. 1-27
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Learning \| Stochastic stability \| Matching \| Marriage \| College admissions

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263593