A partially exclusive rent-seeking contest
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Leppälä, Samuli |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 187.2021, p. 60-75
|
Subject: | Contest design | Interest groups | Multiple-winner contests | Rent dissipation | Rent seeking | Rent-Seeking | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Interessenvertretung | Interest group | Wettbewerb | Competition | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
-
Partial exclusivity can resolve the empirical puzzles associated with rent-seeking activities
Leppälä, Samuli, (2018)
-
Epstein, Gil S., (2002)
-
Politicians, governed vs. non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
Epstein, Gil S., (2013)
- More ...
-
Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information
Leppälä, Samuli, (2013)
-
Theoretical Perspectives on Localised Knowledge Spillovers and Agglomeration
Leppälä, Samuli, (2014)
-
Innovation, R&D spillovers, and the variety and concentration of the local production structure
Leppälä, Samuli, (2015)
- More ...