A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Noda, Shunya |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 141.2023, p. 364-379
|
Subject: | Random assignment | Ordinal mechanisms | Strategy-proofness | Maximum matching | Minimum quota | Matching | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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