A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems

by Gregory Pavlov

We extend the 'no-haggling' result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer's valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restricted when the costs are sufficiently low: the optimal mechanisms use only allocations from the 'north-east' boundary of the feasible set and the null allocation. -- Multidimensional screening ; price discrimination ; optimal selling strategies ; mechanism design

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Pavlov, Gregory
Publisher:	London, Ont. : Dep. of Economics, Social Science Centre, Univ. of Western Ontario
Subject:	Monopol \| Monopoly \| Verkauf \| Selling \| Preisdifferenzierung \| Price discrimination

Extent:	Online-Ressource (14 S.)
Series:	Research report / Department of Economics, Social Science Centre, The University of Western Ontario. - London, Ont. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2256392-1. - Vol. 2010-2
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/70399 [Handle]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D42 - Monopoly ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981290