A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion

We provide a new equilibrium-refinement (a generalization of the Intuitive Criterion) for dynamic incomplete information games. We discuss the properties of this refinement in a class of games that includes sender-receiver games. We also provide applications (certain incomplete information games where collusion may be initiated in a decentralized way) where our predictions differ from those based on other standard refinements

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Schummer, James ; Eso, Peter
Institutions:	Society for Economic Dynamics - SED
Subject:	equilibrium refinement \| collusion

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Series:	2004 Meeting Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Society for Economic Dynamics 2004 Number 483
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085483