A RISK PROGRAMMING APPROACH TO DESIGNING CONTRACTS TO REDUCE NITRATE LEACHING

As contractual agriculture expands, contract design offers a non-regulatory opportunity to reduce non-point source pollution. A risk programming analysis of seed corn contract designs illustrates a tractable empirical principal-agent model, and shows that grower risk preferences affect contract acceptability and efficiency at reducing nitrate leaching.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Chu, Mei-Chin ; Swinton, Scott M. ; Batie, Sandra S.
Institutions:	Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics, Michigan State University
Subject:	Environmental Economics and Policy \| Risk and Uncertainty

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Staff Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Department of Agricultural Economics>Staff Paper Series Number 11594
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005476345