A Simple Characterization of Borda Rule for Fixed Electorate

We consider axiomatic characterization of social choice functions when there exist a fixed number of voters. Our particular interest is in social choice functions that reflect, to some extent, positional information in voters' preference rankings as well as orders between two alternatives. More specifically, we look for social choice functions that satisfy Neutrality, Positive Responsiveness, and Invariance for Average-Position Preserving Reversals. It turns out that there exists one and only one social choice function satisfying the three axioms, namely, Borda rule

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Sato, Norihisa
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963037