A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Hagiwara, Makoto |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 171.2018, p. 51-53
|
Subject: | Double implementation | Semi-social-responsibility | Simple mechanism | Unanimity | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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