A simple numerical evaluation of the incentive contracts for Japan’s defense equipment
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Kasai, Motohiko ; Watanabe, Naoki |
Published in: |
The review of socionetwork strategies. - Tokyo : Springer Japan, ISSN 1867-3236, ZDB-ID 2471097-0. - Vol. 15.2021, 2, p. 575-596
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Subject: | Defense equipment contract | Principal-agent analysis | Cost reduction | Public welfare | Numerical evaluation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Japan | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract |
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