A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
Year of publication: |
2001-12-20
|
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Authors: | Moulin, Hervé ; Bogomolnaia, Anna |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 3, p. 623-636
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Random assignment | No Envy | Strategyproofness | Priority |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Notes: | Received: October 5, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2000 |
Classification: | D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement |
Source: |
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