A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Reny, Philip J. |
Subject: | School choice | Unique stable matching | Pareto efficient matchings | Matching | Schulauswahl | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Hochschule | Higher education institution | Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts | Stability of equilibrium | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism |
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