A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Coughlan, Peter J. ; Le Breton, Michel |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 4.1999, 2, p. 153-160
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Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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COUGHLAN, Peter J.,
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Coughlan, Peter J., (1999)
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