A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	van den Brink, René
Other Persons:	van der Laan, Gerard (contributor) ; Moes, Nigel (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Gerechtigkeit \| Justice \| Shapley-Wert \| Shapley value

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