A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

Lydia Mechtenberg; Johannes Münster

This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some information transmission is possible with unmediated communication. -- Communication ; Information ; Cheap talk ; Mediation

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Münster, Johannes
Publisher:	Berlin : WZB
Subject:	Experten \| Experts \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Vermittlungstätigkeit \| Intermediation \| Systematischer Fehler \| Bias \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 13 S., 185,07 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Industrieller Wandel ; Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Arbeitsgruppe Institutionen, Staaten, Märkte ; Abteilung Wettbewerb und Innovation ; Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten; Forschungsprofessur The Future of Fiscal Federalism ; Forschungs-Gruppe Wettbewerb und Innovation : Schwerpunkt II Märkte und Politik. - Berlin : WZB, ZDB-ID 2406429-4. - Vol. SP II 2010-19
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/54569 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009408044