A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some information transmission is possible with unmediated communication.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Münster, Johannes
Publisher:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Subject:	Communication \| Information \| Cheap talk \| Mediation

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Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; SP II 2010-19
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	682525715 [GVK] hdl:10419/54569 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:SPII201019 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307664