A Subgame-Perfect Implementable Social Choice Correspondebnce Failing to Be Nash Implementable.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sertel, M.R. ; Yilmaz, B. |
Institutions: | Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
Subject: | game theory | economic equilibrium |
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