A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games

Shao Chin Sung; Dinko Dimitrov

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. -- Coalition formation ; Hedonic games ; Separability ; Taxonomy

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Year of publication:	2005
Other Persons:	Sung, Shao Chin (contributor) ; Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor)
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Inst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW
Subject:	Koalition \| Coalition \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts \| Stability of equilibrium \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 17 S., 862 KB)
Series:	Working papers / Universität Bielefeld, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW). - Bielefeld : IMW, ISSN 2942-9536, ZDB-ID 2437810-0. - Vol. 373
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/43765 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; A14 - Sociology of Economics ; D20 - Production and Organizations. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731228