A test for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis for European banks during the financial crisis
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mattana, Paolo ; Petroni, Filippo ; Rossi, Stefania |
Published in: |
Applied economics. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 0003-6846, ZDB-ID 280176-0. - Vol. 47.2015, 4/6, p. 319-332
|
Subject: | financial crises | bailout policy | banking risk | moral hazard | TBTF | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | EU-Staaten | EU countries | Europa | Europe |
-
Do bond investors price tail risk exposures of financial institutions
Chava, Sudheer, (2021)
-
Safer ratios, riskier portfolios : banks׳ response to government aid
Duchin, Ran, (2014)
-
Bailouts and Moral Hazard : How Implicit Government Guarantees Affect Financial Stability
Mariathasan, Mike, (2014)
- More ...
-
A test for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis for European banks during the financial crisis
Mattana, Paolo, (2015)
-
Mascia, Danilo V., (2017)
-
Casula, Laura, (2020)
- More ...