A Theory of Quota Contract with Risk-Averse Agents

This paper studies incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse sales agent in a standard moral-hazard model. We show that a quota-based contract can achieve a first-best outcome when the agent is risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that if the agent is sufficiently risk-averse, this contract also achieve a first-best outcome, even when the agent is protected by limited liability constraint

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Nanba, Toshihiko
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Agentenbasierte Modellierung \| Agent-based modeling \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory

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