A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification

This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification.

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Year of publication:	2008-04
Authors:	Doraszelski, Ulrich ; Escobar, Juan
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	computation \| dynamic stochastic games \| essentiality \| estimation \| finiteness \| genericity \| Markov perfect equilibrium \| purifiability \| regularity \| repeated games \| strong stability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 6805
Classification:	C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497794