A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees
We analyze voting in private and public committees whose members care about the selected decision and the rewards which outsiders pay for representing their interests. We characterize the voting pattern and performance in both committees; and we test these implications on the voting patterns of monetary policy committees.
Year of publication: |
2006-04
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Authors: | Seidmann, Daniel |
Institutions: | Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics |
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Series: | Discussion Papers. - ISSN 1749-3293. |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2006-07 |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453706
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